Controllers at the Atocha coordination center in Madrid ordered the AVE 2080 to follow an incorrect protocol shortly before it collided with the Iryo 6076 in Urda, Toledo, on Wednesday. The crash resulted in at least 69 deaths and 58 injuries. According to Renfe's driver rulebook and testimonies from three experts familiar with the Madrid-Sevilla high-speed line, the error stemmed from a miscommunication regarding safety procedures following a reported technical failure.
The AVE driver had informed Adif network supervisors of a "partial blocking transmission failure," a technical alert indicating a disconnection in the LZB system designed to prevent trains from occupying the same point. Experts state this specific fault should have triggered protocol LZB 3, which limits train speed to "marcha a la vista" (proceed at sight). This restriction ensures the driver can stop in time upon detecting an obstacle. Instead, Atocha controllers instructed the application of protocol LZB 4, leaving speed decisions to the coordination center and authorizing "normal march" without speed limits.
Consequently, the AVE proceeded on a track allowing speeds up to 200 kilometers per hour. Less than twenty minutes later, it struck the Iryo. At such high speeds, trains of this volume require approximately four kilometers to come to a complete stop, making it impossible for a human operator to halt in time if an obstacle is detected late. A trainer familiar with the Madrid-Sevilla line explained that communications are governed by documents known as "telefonemas." The Atocha operator issued LZB 4 when LZB 3 was mandated for partial blocking failures. Protocol LZB 4 recommends disconnecting and reconnecting the LZB system to resume travel under the BSL secondary safety system, but with speed conditions recommended by control, which should have been "marcha a la vista" rather than normal speed.
An engineer involved in installing the LZB system on the Madrid-Sevilla line confirmed that LZB 3 was the correct procedure. This order should have been received by all six trains paralyzed near Urda, not just those involved in the crash. These trains were required to recover LZB functionality while moving from a stop at a maximum of 40 kilometers per hour. Adif declined to comment on protocol application due to the ongoing judicial investigation, though a senior source within the company admitted the protocol was not applied correctly according to railway circulation regulations.
Audio recordings of the events reveal the sequence of errors. At 8:36, the AVE driver reported the transmission failure and noted the presence of another train ahead. The Atocha operator consulted colleagues, expressing confusion while searching for reference materials. "Macho, where is the sheet?" the operator was heard asking before questioning if it was LZB 4. After a moment of hesitation, an unidentified voice confirmed it was protocol four. The operator then instructed the driver to disconnect and reconnect the LZB and resume travel under BSL with normal speed. When the driver expressed surprise at being authorized for "normal march," the controller confirmed the decision.
Meanwhile, at 8:41, the Iryo driver reported a transmission loss and stated she was stopped at the entrance signal of Urda with speed limited to 40 kilometers per hour. Supervisors advised her not to pass the signal but ordered her to reconnect the LZB and resume with "normal march." When the Iryo driver insisted at 8:48 that the system would not restart, controllers responded casually, telling her to call if problems persisted. During this exchange, a female voice in the control center was heard stating the Iryo was having equipment problems and advancing until it stopped, despite the train being stationary. Experts interpret these remarks as confusion regarding the train's status on the coordination screen.
Transport Minister Óscar Puente criticized the Atocha controllers' actions on Wednesday, describing the decision-making chain as "wrong." He noted that the control center decided to resume travel under inexplicable circumstances while a train was stopped and facing a red signal. The minister emphasized that if movement were resumed, it should have been at "marcha a la vista" with a maximum limit of 40 kilometers per hour, identifying this as the origin of the accident.
Puente also highlighted an instance where another driver corrected the control center's error. When instructed to resume at normal speed, one driver argued that only "marcha a la vista" was permissible. The operator immediately agreed and corrected the instruction. This correction was not made for the AVE that ultimately collided with the Iryo. Experts consulted on the matter point to a generalized lack of training among controllers, noting that hesitation is unacceptable during incidents. They argue that while the individual issuing the order bears responsibility, the root cause lies in a system that has permitted deficient training.
Sources: El País Portada.