Hours after the Urda train collision, three audio recordings have been released detailing the communications between Adif's Circulation Regulation Center (CRC) in Atocha and the drivers of the involved trains. The first recording captures the conversation with Antonio Acedo Meneses, the driver of AVE 02080 who died in the crash, while the other two feature calls with the driver of the Iryo train. These were not isolated incidents; the Atocha command post presumably contacted all trains affected by the system failure that led to the accident.
The recordings reveal a mix of technical terminology and colloquial expressions, highlighting uncertainty among control center staff as they consulted one another regarding an anomalous situation. In the call with the AVE, the driver reported a transmission failure due to a partial blockage code 000, indicating that the track section ahead was occupied by another vehicle. Despite this critical warning, the Atocha control center issued an order authorizing the train to proceed at normal speed, leaving the decision on circulation conditions to their discretion rather than adhering to safety protocols for occupied tracks.
The analysis of the first call shows the driver reporting a "meta zero" status, meaning the path to the next station was blocked. Control staff discussed disconnecting the LZB safety system, which regulates train movement through track sections. While regulations offer two options in such scenarios—either proceeding at sight speed without disconnecting the system or disconnecting it with conditions set by control—the center chose the latter. They authorized the disconnection of the LZB and instructed the driver to resume travel under the Lateral Signaling Block (BSL) at normal speeds, exceeding 200 km/h, despite the track being occupied.
During the call, operators expressed confusion over the specific code to use, debating between disconnecting only or disconnecting and reconnecting later. They eventually settled on code LZB4, which allows control to set circulation conditions. The operator explicitly instructed the driver to resume at "normal speed," a directive the driver questioned before accepting. Notably, there was no mention of other trains in this call, even though the system indicated the track ahead was occupied.
In the second recording, the Iryo train driver reported a transmission loss with a target speed of 40 km/h, indicating the track ahead was technically free, and stated she was stopped before the entry signal at Urda. Four minutes after speaking to the AVE driver, control issued the same LZB4 order to the Iryo, authorizing normal speed travel under BSL. However, unlike the AVE which had resumed normal speed by this time, the Iryo remained stationary.
A third call occurred shortly after, where the Iryo driver reported that the train would not allow her to restart the LZB system, leaving her still stopped at the signal. The operator on this call was different from the previous one and simply acknowledged the issue without further instruction. Following this call, internal conversations among control staff revealed ongoing confusion. One voice questioned whether another train, AVE 2061 traveling in the opposite direction, should receive a disconnection order or follow standard procedures for a zero target speed. The only response heard was that there was a problem at Urda.
The audio recordings end approximately three to four minutes before the collision occurred. It remains unconfirmed whether the control center re-established contact with the AVE train, which was reportedly proceeding down the track toward the stationary Iryo during these final moments.
Sources: El País Portada.